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THE CURIOUS EXCLUSION OF CORPORATIONS
FROM THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
CLAUSE OF ARTICLE IV
Stewart Jay*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1869, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Paul v. Virginia that a

corporation was not a "citizen" for purposes of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV of the U.S. Constitution.1 In so
concluding, the Court agreed with dicta in its earlier cases2 and

numerous state court rulings. 3 Corporations were "the mere creation of
local law, [and] can have no legal existence beyond the limits of the

* Professor of Law and Pendleton Miller Chair in Law, University of Washington School of
Law. All grammatical uses in quoted early documents have been left in their original form without a
"sic" to indicate a departure from modem use.
1. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177-78, 182 (1869). The Privileges and Immunities Clause
provides: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in
the several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
2. See, e.g., Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 587 (1839) ("The only rights [a
corporation] can claim are the rights which are given to it in that character, and not the rights which
belong to its members as citizens of a state ... "). For more on Bank of Augusta, see infra
notes 46-48.
3. See, e.g., Ducat v. City of Chicago, 48 Ill. 172, 180-81 (1868), aff'd, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.)
410, 415 (1871) (holding corporations entering another state to do business are not "citizens" under
Article IV); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 68, 78-80 (1868) (same);
Commonwealth v. Milton, 51 Ky. (12 B. Mon.) 212, 216 (1851); Tatem v. Wright, 23 N.J.L. 429,
442 (1852) (opinion of Potts, J.) ("Corporations are not citizens within the meaning of the clause
referred to."); id. at 446 (opinion of Elmer, J.) (asserting that the "citizen" in Article IV, Section 2
means "a natural person"); Bard v. Poole, 12 N.Y. 495, 504 (1855) (stating that "corporations are
not citizens in the sense of' Article IV, Section 2); People v. Imlay, 20 Barb. 68, 80 (N.Y. Gen.
Term 1855) (declaring that "[a]n incorporated company is not a citizen, within the meaning of'
Article IV, Section 2); Wheeden v. Camden & Amboy R.R., 1 Grant 420, 423 (Pa. 1856) (stating
that it was "impossible" for "a corporation [to] be a citizen"); Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 54 Va.
(13 Gratt.) 767, 771-73 (1856).
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sovereignty where created,"4 Justice Stephen J. Field wrote for the
Court. If another state allowed them to do business inside its borders,
"such assent may be granted upon such terms and conditions as those
States may think proper to impose." 5 States could even "exclude the
foreign corporation entirely,"6 "unless such prohibition is so conditioned
as to violate some provision of the Federal Constitution ' 7 other than the
Privileges and Immunities Clause. As far as the clause was concerned,
"[t]he whole matter rests in their discretion," Field underscored.'
The Court has never retreated from these conclusions,9 and
4. Paul, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 181. The exclusion of corporations from Article IV was
subsequently expanded to include a range of organizations, including investment trusts:
Whether a given association is called a corporation, partnership, or trust, is not the
essential factor in determining the powers of a state concerning it. The real nature of the
organization must be considered. If clothed with the ordinary functions and attributes of
a corporation, it is subject to similar treatment.
Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537, 550 (1928).
5. Paul, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 181; see Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404,
407 (1856) ("A corporation created by Indiana can transact business in Ohio only with the consent,
express or implied, of the latter State. This consent may be accompanied by such conditions as Ohio
")(citation omitted); see also St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882)
may think fit to impose ....
(citing Lafayette Ins. Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 407); Fire Dep't of Milwaukee v. Helfenstein, 16
Wis. 142, 145 (1862) (maintaining that a state may impose such restrictions and conditions "as it
sees fit" on nonresident corporations).
6. Paul,75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 181; see S. Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 413 (1910) (citing
W. Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910)) (noting the line of cases that "sustained the right
of the State to exclude a foreign corporation from its borders and to impose conditions upon the
entry of such corporations into the State for the purpose of carrying on business therein"); Attorney
Gen. v. Bay State Mining Co., 99 Mass. 148, 153 (1868) ("The state may deny to foreign
corporations the right to transact their business, hold property, or exercise any corporate function
whatever within its limits. Or it may permit them to exercise such privileges upon terms prescribed
by law ....); Imlay, 20 Barb. at 69, 80-81 (holding that agent of foreign insurance corporation
could be forbidden to do business in state).
7. Sec. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U.S. 246, 249 (1906). Although a state could
impose "such conditions as [it] may think fit" on an out-of-state corporation, they could not be
"repugnant to the constitution or laws of the United States, or inconsistent with those rules of public
law which secure the jurisdiction and authority of each State from encroachment by all others, or
that principle of natural justice which forbids condemnation without opportunity for defence."
Lafayette Ins. Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 407. For example, a state could not condition an out-ofstate corporation's license to do business on not removing cases to federal court. Barron v.
Burnside, 121 U.S. 186, 198, 200 (1887) (stating that "state legislation cannot confer jurisdiction
upon the Federal courts, nor limit or restrict the authority given to them by Congress in pursuance of
the Constitution"); Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 453 (1874) ("The jurisdiction of the
Federal courts... depends upon and is regulated by the laws of the United States. State legislation
cannot confer jurisdiction upon the Federal courts, nor can it limit or restrict the authority given by
Congress in pursuance of the Constitution.").
8. Paul, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 181.
9. See, e.g., Hemphill, 277 U.S. at 548 ("It is settled doctrine that a corporation organized
under the laws of one state may not carry on local business within another without the latter's
A corporation is not a mere collection of individuals capable of claiming all
permission ....
benefits assured them by section 2, article IV, of the Constitution."); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S.
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commentators have accepted the exclusion of corporations from the
clause without protest."°
Denying corporations the protection of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause effectively authorized all types of state
discriminations against companies chartered under the laws of other
jurisdictions. Virginia's highest court held, in 1856, that the legislature
could "forbid foreign corporations from engaging in any pursuit within
the state; and, of consequence, to grant permission to engage therein
only upon terms" that it imposed.1' Or as the Supreme Court bluntly
stated in 1888, "the power of the State to discriminate between her own
domestic corporations and those of other States, desirous of transacting
business within her jurisdiction, was clearly established."' 2
Consequently, in Blake v. McClung, individuals won protection under
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, but corporations with identical
claims lost.' 3
It is hardly surprising that states used their discretionary authority
over foreign corporations to engage in such overt discriminations until
they were found to violate the Dormant Commerce Clause' 4 and the
239, 259 (1898) (holding that "a corporation is not a citizen within the meaning of [Article IV,
Section 2]"); Norfolk & W. R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U.S. 114, 118 (1890) ("[C]orporations are
not citizens, within the meaning of clause 1, see 2, of art. IV .... "); Pembina Consol. Silver Mining
& Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 187-88 (1888) ("[C]orporations are not citizens
within the meaning of [Article IV, Section 2, which] ... applies only to natural persons, members of
the body politic owing allegiance to the State, not to artificial persons created by the legislature, and
possessing only such attributes as the legislature has prescribed .... "); Ducat v. Chicago, 77 U.S.
(10 Wall.) 410, 415 (1871) ("The power of the State to discriminate between her own domestic
corporations and those of other States, desirous of transacting business within her jurisdiction, is
clearly established .... ).
10. See, e.g., THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 188 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1880) ("And the term citizens,
as here used, applies only to natural persons, members of the body politic, owing allegiance to the
State, and not to corporations, which are artificial persons created by the legislature, and possessing
only the attributes which the legislature has prescribed."). One leading modem treatise merely
mentions the doctrine in a footnote. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
544 n.92 (2d ed. 1988).
11. Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 767, 773 (1856); see Caldwell v. Armour,
43 A. 517, 518 (Del. Super. Ct. 1899) ("Corporations are the creatures of the local law, and have no
right of recognition in other states without their assent, and upon such terms as they may impose.");
Tatem v. Wright, 23 N.J.L. 429, 441 (1852) (opinion of Potts, J.) (noting that if states can exclude
all foreign corporations, they can permit them "upon terms" as they wish-in this instance, a special
tax); id. at 447 (opinion of Elmer, J.) ("[A]n incorporation has no right to go beyond the limits of
the sovereignty which created it, and if it does, must submit to such terms as other sovereignties see
fit to impose.").
12. Pembina Consol. Silver Mining, 125 U.S. at 188.
13. 172 U.S. at 258-59; see infra text accompanying notes 22-23.
14. The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution states: "The Congress shall have
Power .... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States ....
U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The "Dormant Commerce Clause" is the theory that Congress's power to
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Equal Protection Clause, both of which were held to protect
corporations. 5 One of the Court's major justifications for recognizing
the Dormant Commerce Clause was that out-of-state businesses were not
in a position to defend themselves in state political processes on a level
playing field with their local counterparts. 16 The same rationale lies
behind the Privileges and Immunities Clause, regardless of
whether the businesses being protected are corporations, partnerships, or
sole proprietorships. 7
There are many examples of such discriminations against
corporations chartered in other states that were sustained by courts
before the Court enlisted the Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment to stop them. States exacted licensing fees or
imposed special taxes on foreign corporations for the "privilege" of
doing business in the jurisdiction. 8 Most notably, they taxed foreign
regulate interstate commerce implies a restriction on the states, preventing legislatures from passing
statutes inhibiting interstate commerce. See Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant
Commerce Clause and the ConstitutionalBalance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 570 ("The
Court has [invalidated a state regulation as a violation of the commerce clause] when it has found
that such regulation either discriminates against out-of-state interests or unduly burdens the free
flow of commerce among the states."). The Court held that state taxes and regulations
discriminating against interstate business transactions violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. See,
e.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1910) (holding that state tax violated the
Dormant Commerce Clause in requiring that "as a condition of its being allowed to do intrastate
business in Kansas," a company must pay a tax based "on all its property, business and interests
everywhere, including both its interstate and intrastate business and property"); Pittsburg & S. Coal
Co. v. Bates, 156 U.S. 577, 588 (1895) (holding the Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits state laws
that "will impose any discriminating burden or tax upon the citizens or products of other States
coming or brought within its jurisdiction"); Norfolk & W. R.R., 136 U.S. at 115, 120 (holding the
state violated the Dormant Commerce Clause by passing a law requiring foreign corporations to
either invest capital in the state or pay an annual license fee); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 280
(1875) (stating that "the very object" of the Commerce Clause was to combat discriminating
state legislation).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 874-75, 883
(1985) (holding that higher taxes on out-of-state corporations violated the Equal Protection Clause,
noting the "somewhat checkered history" on the applicability of that clause to state taxes that
discriminated against out-of-state businesses); Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494,
516-17 (1926) (holding that state law violated the Equal Protection Clause by imposing a tax on the
net receipts of foreign insurers that domestic companies did not have to pay). Compare Lincoln
Nat'l Life Ins. v. Read, 325 U.S. 673, 677 (1945) (holding tax on foreign corporations for
"privilege" of doing business in state was not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause), with S.
Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 401, 416-17 (1910) (holding that higher state tax on foreign railroad
than on local carriers violated the Equal Protection Clause).
16. See infra text accompanying note 96.
17. See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 662 (1975) (stating that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause "implicates ...the structural balance essential to the concept of federalism," by
addressing the fact that "nonresidents are not represented in the ...legislative halls" outside their
own states).
18. See, e.g., Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181,
185-86, 190 (1888) (holding that out-of-state corporations that did not invest capital in state could
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corporations at higher rates than they did comparable domestic
businesses. 9 States were allowed to limit the business activities of
foreign corporations "to particular localities; or they [might] exact such
security for the performance of its contracts with their citizens as in their
judgment [would] best promote the public interests. '2° Foreign
corporations generally were permitted to own property or sue in the
courts of states outside their place of incorporation, but only by comity.21
They could be forbidden altogether to employ the state's courts to
vindicate their legal claims, and consequently states were able to impose
terms for allowing access that favored their own citizens. 2' For instance,
out-of-state corporations could be subordinated to state citizens in
distributing the assets of an insolvent company,2 3 or be required to
appoint an agent to receive service of process. 24 Likewise, as a condition
of maintaining offices in the state, foreign corporations could be obliged
to invest a minimum amount of capital there.25
This Article examines the rationales that courts have given for
excluding corporations from protection by the Privileges and Immunities
be obliged to pay a tax computed as a percentage of the company's authorized capital stock);
Commonwealth v. Milton, 51 Ky. (12 B. Mon.) 212, 228-30 (1851) (allowing special licensing and
higher taxes for foreign corporations); Tatem v. Wright, 23 N.J.L. 429, 440-42 (1852) (opinion of
Potts, J.) (upholding tax on agents of foreign insurance companies).
19. See Ducat v. Chicago, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 410, 415 (1871) (holding that out-of-state
corporations may be taxed at different rates than domestic corporations of the same character); State
v. Lathrop, 61 La. (10 La. Ann.) 398, 402 (1855) (upholding a tax on foreign insurance companies
of twice the amount imposed on domestic companies); Tatem, 23 N.J.L. at 440, 442 (opinion of
Potts, J.) (sustaining "a special tax" of two and one-half percent on gross premiums for insurance
received by "non-resident individuals or companies not incorporated by the laws of the state").
20. Pembina Consol. Silver Mining, 125 U.S. at 185 (quoting Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 168, 181 (1869)).
21. See N.Y. Dry Dock v. Hicks, 18 F. Cas. 151, 153 (C.C.D. Mich. 1850) (No. 10,204)
(declaring that states could not deprive foreign corporations "the comity of collecting their debts by
suits in other states, and of holding property therein received as security for their debts, or in
payment of them").
22. See Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537, 543-44, 548, 550-51 (1928) (holding that a foreign
corporation could not sue in state court to collect on a promissory note because it had not complied
with aspects of state corporation law); Bothwell v. Buckbee, Mears Co., 275 U.S. 274, 275-77
(1927) (holding that out-of-state insurance company could not sue in state court to enforce
insurance contract without complying with its licensing requirements); Fire Dep't of N.Y. v. Noble,
3 E.D. Smith 440, 450-51 (N.Y. Ct. Coin. Pl. 1854) ("[T]he state might prohibit foreign
corporations from bringing actions in our courts.").
23. Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 259, 261 (1898) (holding that an out-of-state
corporation could be denied the "right to participate upon terms of equality with Tennessee creditors
in the distribution of the assets" of debtors).
24. See Lafayette Ins. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 407-08 (1856) (holding that a state
could require a foreign corporation to appoint agent to receive service of process).
25. See Norfolk & W. R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U.S. 114, 118 (1890) (stating that a
Pennsylvania law did not violate Article IV, Section 2, by requiring foreign corporations to invest
capital in the state or pay an annual license fee).
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Clause.26 It also will ask why the Supreme Court would make that
determination while finding that corporations were "citizens" for
purposes of federal judicial jurisdiction, as well as "persons" under the
Equal Protection and the Due Process Clauses (and a huge number of
statutes). In retrospect, it would have been more logical to recognize
Article IV as a vehicle for shielding out-of-state corporations from
discrimination. This conclusion does not mean the present Court should,
much less would, abandon almost a century and a half of precedent and
begin including corporations under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. Rather, this Article is about a forgotten avenue of constitutional
history. Walking that lane shows how the meaning of citizenship and
attitudes about corporations have changed significantly since the
beginning of the American republic.
II.

THE RATIONALES FOR EXCLUDING CORPORATIONS FROM THE
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE

Nineteenth-century courts produced several overlapping rationales
to justify concluding that corporations were not citizens under Article
IV. The most basic argument was essentialist-that the word "citizen"
inherently could only apply to a human. Many courts agreed with
William Blackstone's characterization of corporations as "artificial
persons."27 Chief Justice John Marshall declared, in 1809, that a
corporation was an "invisible, intangible, and artificial being, [a] mere
legal entity, a corporation aggregate," that "certainly [was] not a
citizen."2 8 Ten years later, he used similar language to describe
corporations in Dartmouth College v. Woodward.29 A New Jersey
Supreme Court justice, in 1852, wrote that "[i]n the very nature of
things, the citizen referred to [in Article IV] is a natural person, a human
being having rights.., as a member of a free government, and not a

26.

See infra Part II.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *455; see Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S.
(13 Pet.) 519, 586 (1839) (stating that a corporation was an "artificial being"); Slaughter v.
Commonwealth, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 767, 772 (1856) (stating that corporations were "artificial
persons"); THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS: CONTAINING THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ALL THE
CORPORATIONS AND INFERIOR COURTS OF RECORD IN ENGLAND 1-2 (London, Assigns of Richard
and Edward Atkins 1702) [hereinafter LAW OF CORPORATIONS] ("A Corporation or Incorporation is
a Body framed by Policy or Fiction of law, and it's therefore called a Body Politick; and it's called
an Incorporation or Body Incorporate, because the Persons are made into a Body which endureth in
perpetual Succession; and are of Capacity to grant, sue or be sued, and the like.").
28. Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86 (1809). Marshall was discussing
whether a corporation was a citizen for the purpose of Article III
diversity jurisdiction. Id.
29. Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (describing a
corporation as "an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law").

27.
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mere artificial person, the creature of a special charter, having no rights
but such as are thereby granted."3 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
asserted, in 1856, that the Framers of the Constitution, "doubtless, by
design, and on good reasons," left corporations "out of the federative
system altogether."3 They "well understood," the court continued, that
"citizen" meant "a human being-a natural person, capable of acting,
contracting, suing and being sued without legislative aids."32
The judges who originated the idea of leaving corporations outside
the clause relied heavily on the fact that corporations could not, by their
nature, exercise some of the major attributes of citizenship, which
implied to them that it was impossible for these entities to be "citizens."
A person was able to move from state to state at will, but this was not so
for a corporation. Chief Justice Roger B. Taney pointed out, in 1839,
that a corporation "can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of
the sovereignty by which it is created .... It must dwell in the place of
its creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty. '33 "[L]ocomotion" was one of the natural rights of persons recognized by
Blackstone, 34 but corporations could not exercise the corollary privilege
of subjects "to pass through, or to reside in any other state."35 A
corporation also had a quality that no human could obtain-it was "but
one person in law, a person that never dies," Blackstone noted,3 6 even
though he acknowledged that there were several ways for a corporation
to be dissolved, including "[b]y act of parliament, which is boundless
in its operations." 37 In addition, corporations were able to own
property in perpetuity, whereas, alas, humans could not take it with them
in the end.38
Chief Justice Taney wrote for the Court, in the 1839 decision Bank
ofAugusta v. Earle, that "corporations of one state are permitted to make
contracts in another" only as a matter of comity, "the voluntary act of the
30.
31.
32.
33.

Tatem v. Wright, 23 N.J.L. 429,446 (1852) (opinion of Elmer, J.).
Wheeden v. Camden & AmboyR.R., 1 Grant 420, 423-24 (Pa. 1856).
Id.at 424.
Bank ofAugusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839).

34.

BLACKSTONE, supranote 27, at *130-31.

35. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). Other courts also
held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause guaranteed the right of interstate travel. See, e.g.,
In re Archy, 9 Cal. 147, 164 (1858) (holding that Article rV, Section 2 protects the right of every
citizen of the United States to pass freely through every other state with his property of every
description, including slaves); Julia v. McKinney, 3 Mo. 270, 272 (1833) (stating that it is
undoubtedly the "right of every citizen of the United States to pass freely through every other State
with his property of every description, including negro slaves").
36. BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *456.
37. Id. at *473.
38. See id. at *456 (stating that corporations could own property indefinitely).
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nation by which it is offered."3 9 Approval could be refused "when
contrary to its policy, or prejudicial to its interests., 40 The New Jersey
Supreme Court held, in 1852, that this doctrine was "decisive" on the
question of whether corporations could be citizens under Article IV. 41
Considering that "a foreign corporation can only make contracts in this
state by mere comity, and this comity is inadmissible where it is contrary
to our policy," the New Jersey court reasoned, "there can be no pretence
42
that it stands ... clothed with the rights of a citizen of another state.,
Besides, the Virginia court quoted earlier added, states did treat
individuals from other states the same as local citizens when they
operated corporations.43 State citizens could not, by "virtue of their mere
citizenship," perform any "corporate act whatever."' As the Kentucky
Court of Appeals pointed out, individual citizens of other states "at their
own option" were as free "as the citizens of this State" to form
corporations under Kentucky law.45 Put differently, forming a
corporation might be a privilege under state law, but it was not
considered a privilege of citizenship.
Chief Justice Taney also contended that it would be incompatible
with the corporate form to consider these entities as exercising the
privileges and immunities of their members:
If... the members of a corporation were to be regarded as individuals
carrying on business in their corporate name, and therefore entitled to
the privileges of citizens in matters of contract, it is very clear that they
must at the same time take upon themselves the liabilities of citizens,
46
and be bound by their contracts in like manner.
Obliging the owners of corporations to accept the burdens imposed
on citizens, such as exposure of personal assets to suit, Taney continued,
"would be to make a corporation a mere partnership in business, in
which each stockholder would be liable to the whole extent of his
property for the debts of the corporation; and he might be sued for them,
in any state in which he might happen to be found. ' 47 In other words, the
39. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 589 (1839).
40. Id.; see also Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906) ("[A corporation] receives certain
special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the State and the limitations
of its charter. Its powers are limited by law. It can make no contract not authorized by its charter.").
41. Tatem v. Wright, 23 N.J.L. 429, 443 (1852) (opinion of Potts, J.); see id at 445 (opinion
of Elmer, J.).
42. Id. at 443 (opinion of Potts, J.).
43. See supratext accompanying note 11.
44. Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 767, 771 (1856).
45. Commonwealth v. Milton, 51 Ky. (12 B. Mon.) 212, 217 (1851).
46. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586 (1839).
47. Id.
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individual owners of the corporation could not demand "the privileges of
citizens in the several states, and at the same time" expect to be
"exempt... from the liabilities which the exercise of such privileges
48
would bring upon individuals who were citizens of the state.,
Some courts stressed the sheer novelty of the claim that
corporations should be considered citizens under the clause. The mere
fact that they had never been so treated seemed a good reason to reject
the possibility. A Kentucky court, in 1851, noted that the seminal federal
case interpreting the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Corfield v.
Coryell, 49 made no "reference to corporations or corporate rights, or to
any peculiar privileges, or to the right of a corporation to make contracts,
or acquire property, or do any corporate act beyond the limits of the
State which creates it."5 Once stare decisis kicked in, the issue was
never seriously re-examined, and eventually, corporations stopped trying
to change the minds of the judges and turned to other parts of the
Constitution for relief from discriminatory legislation.
III.

THE ILLOGIC OF EXCLUDING CORPORATIONS FROM THE
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE

Many of these arguments against including corporations within the
purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause are superficially
plausible, but they all have fundamental flaws. To begin with, keep in
mind that the issue is not whether a person's ability to form a
corporation is a privilege of citizenship, but rather whether corporations,
once formed, should be treated as citizens for purposes of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause. Further, the clause only requires a state to treat
citizens of other states in the same way they would their own citizens,
and a state might not treat its own citizens equally.5' As the Minnesota
Supreme Court said in 1862, the clause did not extend "absolute equality
of rights and privileges with every citizen of each state of the Union, but
all such privileges and immunities in any state as are, by the Constitution
and laws thereof, secured, or extended, to her own people of the same

48. Id.
49. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
50. Milton, 51 Ky. (12 B. Mon.) at 220.
51. Detroit v. Osborne, 135 U.S. 492, 498 (1890) (holding that when the citizen of one state
goes into another, that person is "entitled... to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of that
State; but, under that Constitution, he can claim no more," and that the person "walks the streets and
high ways in that State entitled to the same rights and protection, but none other, than those
accorded by its laws to its own citizens"); Costin v. Washington, 6 F. Cas. 612, 613-14 (C.C.D.C.
1821) (No. 3,266) ("A citizen of one state, coming into another state, can claim only those
privileges and immunities which belong to citizens of the latter state, in like circumstances.").
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class, and otherwise similarly situated."52 For example, many decisions
prior to the Civil War held that even when free blacks were considered
citizens by a state, in other states they were entitled to no more
than the discriminatory treatment those jurisdictions afforded their own
freemen (which could include not being allowed to reside in the state
53
once freed).
If corporations were counted as citizens under the clause when
doing business in states outside their place of incorporation, they would
only be entitled to the same treatment those other states afforded their
own corporations. The reason is simple: were states obliged to treat
foreign corporations like individual citizens for purposes of the clause,
rather than domestic corporations, their police powers would be
seriously undermined. The courts that fretted over including
corporations within the clause because they would be entitled to all the
rights of individual citizens did not see this obvious limitation.
The heart of the argument against bringing corporations within the
ambit of the clause centered on the idea that, as artificial persons, they
could act only under the terms of their legislatively-controlled charters,
and then solely within the borders of their states, unless another state
allowed them to operate there by comity. A corporation required "the
permission, express or implied, of the sovereign in whose territory the
corporation attempts to operate."54 Natural persons who were citizens of
other states did not require such approval."
This line of thinking assumed the conclusion it was trying to prove.
If corporations were considered citizens for purposes of the clause in the
first place, states could not exclude them or discriminate against their
business activities any more than they could natural persons. The whole
idea that corporations somehow do not exist outside their states of

52. Davis v. Pierse, 7 Minn. 13, 21 (1862).
53. Chancellor James Kent noted that free blacks were allowed to vote in some states, but in
other states, they were subject to "such disabilities as the laws of the states respectively may deem it
expedient to prescribe to free persons of colour." 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN
LAw 258 n.b (New York, 5th ed. 1844) (detailing special restrictions on free blacks, including
bonding requirements).
54. Milton, 51 Ky. (12 B. Mon.) at 219; see Bard v. Poole, 12 N.Y. 495, 504 (1855) (stating
that laws of the state creating a corporation have "no extra-territorial operation"); People v. Imlay,
20 Barb. 68, 80 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1855) (stating that a corporation is "a creation of the state which
incorporates it," that this state "has no power to legislate for other states, or to give to the artificial
bodies which it creates powers to act in other states," and that "[s]uch companies act in other states
than those which incorporate them, only by the comity of such other states").
55. The right of a person to travel throughout the British Empire was a privilege of subjects.
See David S.Bogen, The Privilegesand Immunities Clause of Article IV, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
794, 817 (1987); David R. Upham, Note, Corfield v. Coryell and the Privilegesand Immunities of
American Citizenship, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1483, 1493 (2005).
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incorporation is based on nineteenth-century formalism-the very sort
that lay behind the now discredited theory of territorial jurisdiction in
Pennoyer v. Neff. 6 Obviously there is nothing physically impossible
about corporations doing business outside their state of inception. For, as
a federal circuit court pointed out in 1850, "nothing in their
organization... should deprive them" of the ability to exercise the same
types of powers available to individuals, such as holding property and
suing for debt collection. 7 When corporations do business outside their
home states, the laws of the foreign jurisdiction apply to their operations,
which is no different than when individuals or partnerships act away
from their home states.58 Modem corporations often have very little
actual presence in their incorporating states in comparison to their
operations elsewhere.
It is also irrelevant that all the privileges of corporations are the
result of state grace. The same goes for flesh and blood. All "privileges"
were "creations of the local law," a Kentucky court noted, and "can not
by the mere force of that law, exist or be exercised beyond its territorial
jurisdiction."59 Moreover, any privilege or immunity can be revoked by
a state, regardless of whether it advantages a natural person or a
corporation. Humans may have natural rights that soulless
corporations cannot possess, such as freedom of conscience and the right
to bodily integrity, but these never have been regarded as privileges
of citizenship.6"
Chief Justice Taney's argument for excluding corporations from the
purview of the clause-that their shareholders could not be personally
liable-proved too much. Corporations have long been treated by law as
citizens or persons for many purposes. 61 They enjoy a lengthy list of
legal privileges that are the same as those possessed by individual
citizens, and did so when Taney wrote, including the rights to own
property and to sue and be sued in a corporate name.62 Corporations
56. 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878) (holding that "no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and
authority over persons or property without its territory"); see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General
Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 241, 271 (stating that Pennoyer "is an
example parexcellence of what Karl Llewellyn called the Formal Style in juristic reasoning").
57. N.Y. Dry Dock v. Hicks, 18 F. Cas. 151, 153 (C.C.D. Mich. 1850) (No. 10,204).
58. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
59. Commonwealth v. Milton, 51 Ky. (12 B. Mon.) 212, 219 (1851).
60. See Stewart Jay, Origins of the Privileges and Immunities of State Citizenship Under
Article IV, 45 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 52-69 (2013) (describing the relationship between natural rights
and privileges and immunities of citizenship).
61. See infra notes 62-69.
62. See Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558
(1844); BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *456; 1 STEWART KYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS 69-226 (London, J. Butterworth 1793) (describing corporate powers, capacities and
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receive many of the same procedural protections in criminal and civil
cases as individuals, and these have long been understood as privileges
of citizenship.6 3 By exercising those privileges, such as bringing a
lawsuit or demanding a trial by jury, a corporation's shareholders do not
expose themselves personally to the jurisdiction of the state's courts on
unrelated claims. The same is true when corporations invoke federal
diversity jurisdiction.
In other constitutional contexts, in the nineteenth century and
beyond, the Court has counted corporations as citizens or persons. The
basis of these rulings was acknowledgement that individuals owned the
companies-real people who suffered from corporate losses and profited
by their gains. Chief Justice Marshall wrote for the Court, in 1809, that
although corporations were not state "citizens" per se,6 they nonetheless
could in effect be counted as such for purposes of federal diversity
jurisdiction under Article 111.65 In so ruling, Marshall gave a rationale
that should have applied equally to the Privileges and Immunities
Clause: "For the term citizen ought to be understood as it is used in the
constitution, and as it is used in other laws. That is, to describe the real
66
persons who come into court, in this case, under their corporate name.
Elaborating on this point, in 1853, Justice Robert C. Grier remarked for
the Court that while it was "no doubt metaphysically true in a certain
sense" that a corporation existed as an "artificial person," it was equally
true that
a citizen who has made a contract, and has a "controversy" with a
corporation... [does] not deal with a mere metaphysical abstraction,
but with natural persons; that his writ has not been served on an
incapacities); see also Jay, supra note 60, at 23-24, 35 n.194 (describing corporate privileges). The
Court in Louisville, Cincinnati& CharlestonR.R. v. Letson said:
[A] corporation created by and doing business in a particular state, is to be deemed to all
intents and purposes as a person, although an artificial person, an inhabitant of the same
state, for the purposes of its incorporation, capable of being treated as a citizen of that
state, as much as a natural person. Like a citizen it makes contracts, and though in regard
to what it may do in some particulars it differs from a natural person,... it is
substantially, within the meaning of the law, a citizen of the state which created it, and
where its business is done, for all the purposes of suing and being sued.
43 U.S. (2 How.) at 558.
63. The rights relating to criminal prosecutions and civil actions protected in the Bill of
Rights and state constitutions were regarded as privileges of citizenship in early America and
England, even if their purpose was to protect natural rights. See Jay, supra note 60, at 67.
Corporations, however, are not covered by certain provisions of the Bill of Rights. For example,
they do not have a right against self-incrimination. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 105
(1988) (citing Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906)).
64. Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86-91 (1809).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 91.
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imaginary entity, but on men and citizens; and that his contract was
made with them as the legal representatives
of numerous unknown
67
associates, or secret and dormant partners.
Diversity jurisdiction was created by the Framers in response to
"apprehensions" that state courts would not "administer justice as
impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every description,"
namely people from other states and nations. 68 Exactly the same problem
confronted corporations, Marshall contended: "Aliens, or citizens of
different states, are not less susceptible of these apprehensions, nor can
they be supposed to be less the objects of constitutional provision,
because they are allowed to sue by a corporate name. '69 Even though the
corporation appeared in the action, "essentially, the parties in such a
case" were the corporation's owners.7 ° Thus, when they were "aliens, or
citizens of a different state from the opposite party," the lawsuit
"come[s] within the spirit and terms of the jurisdiction conferred by the
constitution on the national tribunals.'
The very reason why the Constitution created diversity jurisdiction,
the Court explained, in 1853, quoting The Federalist No. 80, was to
enforce "the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several
States. 72 It is odd to suppose the Framers meant to allow corporations to
invoke the diversity jurisdiction of federal courts in order to protect
themselves against discrimination, and then decide they had no
privileges and immunities to protect. Most likely, they did not consider
whether corporations were citizens for any purpose. 73 Nonetheless, many
years after the ratification of the Constitution, the Court drew a bright
line between the use of "citizen" in Article III and Article IV. Chief
Justice Taney remarked, in 1839, that "the principle" regarding
corporations as citizens for purposes of diversity jurisdiction had "never
been extended any farther."74 Nor would it ever.
Judges strained to explain why corporations that were citizens for
Article III purposes were not so under Article IV. A Pennsylvania court,
in 1856, was confounded by the distinction, because "[t]he received
rules of interpretation would require us to understand the same word in

67. Marshall v. Bait. & Ohio R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 327 (1854).
68. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 87.
69. Id
70. Id. at 88.
71. Id.
72. Marshall, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 326 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 537 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
73. See infra notes 124-34 and accompanying text.
74. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586 (1839).
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the same sense, throughout the instrument, if not controlled in certain
places by the context. '75 That being so, "if the word citizen, when used
in the 4th article, did not include corporations, how, it might be asked,
can it be construed in the 3d article to embrace them? ' 76 The court found
"nothing in the context of either article to impart a shade of meaning to
the word, different from the common understanding of its sense," which
was that citizens were real people. v To resolve the dilemma, it correctly
interpreted the Court's decisions as holding that for diversity purposes,
"the members of the corporation, who were natural persons, and the
substantial parties on the record, were citizens," and, in effect, the suit
involved them personally.7 8
The problem with this resolution, as the Pennsylvania court
recognized, was that it entailed concluding that the corporation's place
of citizenship was that of its "stockholders or corporators" for purposes
of determining diversity.79 Yet the Court already had held that a
corporation was "entitled, for the purpose of suing and being sued, to be
deemed a citizen of that state" in which it was incorporated, removing
the relevance of the shareholders' citizenship.8" This contradiction
matured into a venerable legal fiction that law students now learn
as a verity.
In 1886, the Court ruled that corporations were "persons" under the
Equal Protection Clause.81 No explanation was given for this conclusion.
Chief Justice Morrison Waite informed counsel that the Justices did not
"wish to hear argument on the question," as they were "all of opinion"
that corporations were protected by the Equal Protection Clause.82
Likewise, the Court, in the same era, applied the Due Process Clause to
safeguard corporations against arbitrary deprivations of their property.83
75. Wheeden v. Camden & Amboy R.R., I Grant 420, 424 (Pa. 1856).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 425.
79. Id. at 428; see also id. at 425 (stating that "the court felt itself authorized to look to the
character of the individuals composing the corporation, for the purpose of sustaining a
jurisdiction").
80. Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 555 (1844); see
also St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. James, 161 U.S. 545, 563 (1896) ("[T]he presumption of citizenship is
one of law, not to be defeated by allegation or evidence to the contrary."); Marshall v. Bait. & Ohio
R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 329 (1853) (holding "conclusive" the "presumption" that the state of
incorporation was "the residence or citizenship of those who use the corporate name and exercise
the faculties conferred by it").
81. Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
82. Id.
83. See Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896) ("The taking by a State of the
private property of one person or corporation, without the owner's consent, for the private use of
another, is not due process of law, and is a violation of the Fourteenth ... Amendment .... ").
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These conclusions must have been based on the view that a corporation
was the embodiment of individuals who possessed rights.
All of this is a fiction. A corporation is neither a "person" nor a
"citizen" in the sense that those terms are applied to individuals. 84
Today, in fact, it is perhaps more natural to speak colloquially of a
corporation as a citizen than a person. Americans invoke "corporate
citizenship" when urging companies to engage in responsible business
practices and make contributions to the communities in which they
operate. Whether corporations are "persons," on the other hand, is a
matter of heated political debate. Rhetoric aside, the undeniable reality is
that real people own corporations.
The justifications for "piercing the veil" of corporations in order to
include them under diversity jurisdiction and the Fourteenth Amendment
apply with just as much force to the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
In all of these contexts, the actual parties concerned are the corporation's
shareholders: "A corporation aggregate is constituted of citizens who,
for the purposes of their charter, are authorized to act in the name they
have assumed, having the rights generally which may be exercised by an
individual."85 The federal Dictionary Act recognizes this, at least
implicitly, by providing that for purposes of interpreting statutes, "the
words 'person' and 'whoever' include corporations, companies,
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as
well as individuals. 86
Treating corporations as citizens under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause would be much more consistent with its original
purpose than the Court's resolution, that states have total discretion in
limiting their rights.8 7 It is illogical that owners of business entities
operated as corporations can have their privileges and immunities
subjected to the whims of states when they would have a great many
rights if they operated them as sole proprietorships or partnerships88 (the
84. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973) (reviewing the use of "person" in the
Constitution, and finding that "in nearly all these instances, the use of the word is such that it has
application only postnatally").
85. N.Y. DryDock v. Hicks, 18 F. Cas. 151, 153 (C.C.D. Mich. 1850) (No. 10,204).
86. The Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No.
13-354, slip op. at 19 (U.S. June 30, 2014) ("We have no doubt that 'person,' in a legal setting,
often refers to artificial entities. The Dictionary Act makes that clear." (quoting FCC v. AT&T Inc.,
131 S.Ct. 1177, 1182-83 (2011))).
87. See supranotes 1-8 and accompanying text.
88. In 1852, a lawyer arguing before the New Jersey Supreme Court stated aptly:
[T]he rights and privileges of [the corporation] are less than those of the separate
individuals who compose it. There seems to be no good reason why it should be so held,
any more than in the case of a copartnership; but on the contrary, that the courts will take
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same is true of non-profit corporations.) There is a paradox in courts
acknowledging that corporations can contract, own property, and sue
and be sued, while holding that the underlying rights involved are at the
mercy of state discretion. The discriminatory state trade laws of the
1780s that were the immediate impetus for including the clause in the
Constitution would not have been any less a source of interstate tension
if applied to businesses run as corporations.8 9 Businesses just did not
typically operate as corporations in those days.
Eventually, the Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Commerce Clause as outlawing many types of state discriminations
against foreign corporations.9" But the Framers could not have
anticipated these developments. It is worth considering that because the
Privileges and Immunities Clause was held not to protect corporations,
even as this form of business became essential to the American
economy, these other provisions were recruited to provide a
constitutional basis for stopping discrimination against companies with
interstate operations. Elimination of that clause as a protective
mechanism for corporations left a vacuum that was filled by interpreting
other parts of the Constitution in ways that went well beyond what their
texts or drafting histories directly supported. 91
These alternatives had substantial drawbacks as constitutional
interpretations. For example, the question of using the Equal Protection
Clause as the basis for striking state laws that discriminated against
foreign companies drew a persuasive dissent from four members of the
Court in Metropolitan Life v. Ward.92 Writing for the four, Justice
notice that corporations are composed of individual citizens, and take care to protect
their constitutional rights.
Tatem v. Wright, 23 N.J.L. 429,432-33 (1852) (expressing defendants' counsel's argument).
89. See Jay, supra note 60, at 9-15 (describing how concerns over interstate trade
discrimination led to inclusion of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in the Constitution).
90. Id. at 3.
91. The two clauses serve different ends, even if they overlap in application. The Dormant
Commerce Clause "protects the interstate market, not particular interstate firms, from prohibitive or
burdensome regulations." Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 127-28 (1978). By
contrast, the Privileges and Immunities Clause bars state discrimination based on citizenship in
another state. So long as the law in question equally burdens local citizens and Americans from outof-state, it does not matter for purposes of the clause that the flow of commerce is thereby disrupted.
See Atkinson v. Phila. & T.R. Co., 2 F. Cas. 105, 106, 109 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1834) (No. 615) (rejecting
a claim by a citizen of another state that a law authorizing a bridge that obstructed "free navigation"
of the river violated Article IV because it equally affected the state's citizens); Allen v. Sarah, 2
Del. (2 Harr.) 434, 439 (1838) (holding that the state could ban exportation of slaves by both its
citizens and citizens of other states); Shipper v. Pa. R.R., 47 Pa. 338, 343-44 (1864) (holding that a
higher tonnage tax on foreign versus domestic goods did not violate the clause because the tax
"denie[d] to no citizen of another state any privilege or immunity which it d[id] not deny to
[Pennsylvania's] own citizens").
92. 470 U.S. 869, 883 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Sandra Day O'Connor objected to the departure from the usual
deference given to states in tax and economic regulatory matters. 93 She
also pointed out that if states could not discriminate against out-of-state
companies by virtue of the Equal Protection Clause, neither could
Congress authorize them to do so, which might adversely affect the
ability "of the Federal Government to formulate economic policy."94
As for the Dormant Commerce Clause, its existence can only be
justified by imaginative inferences from the constitutional text and a few
scraps of statements by the Framers and ratifiers, all bound together by
modem political theory.95 Earlier it was noted that a major justification
for the doctrine is the need to protect out-of-state businesses from the
vicissitudes of local political processes over which they have no
influence. Thus, the Court has said: "In applying [the Dormant
Commerce Clause] the Court has often recognized that to the extent that
the burden of state regulation falls on interests outside the state, it is
unlikely to be alleviated by the operation of those political
restraints normally exerted when interests within the state are
affected." 96 Precisely the same concern underlies the Privileges and
97
Immunities Clause.
By the same token, it is anomalous that for-profit corporations have
First Amendment rights, yet under Article IV they cannot claim the
privileges and immunities possessed by individual owners of those
businesses.98 As the Court, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
93. Id.at 893-902.
94. Id. at 901. Some commentators in the nineteenth century thought that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause conferred "a personal right which neither Congress nor a State can impair." 2
JOHN RANDOLPH TUCKER, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF

ITS GENESIS, DEVELOPMENT, AND INTERPRETATION 530 (Henry St. George Tucker ed., Chicago,
Callaghan & Co. 1899). But there are no reported cases involving an attempt by Congress to
override the clause.
95. See Brannon P. Denning, Confederation-EraDiscriminationAgainst Interstate Commerce
and the Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 94 KY. L.J. 37, 81-99 (2005-2006)
(arguing that the Dormant Commerce Clause is consistent with original intent of the Constitution's
drafters and ratifiers). But see Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S.
232, 260, 263 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that there is a "lack of any clear theoretical
underpinning for judicial 'enforcement' of the Commerce Clause"); FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 12-14 (1937) (arguing that there was
"no expression" by the drafters and ratifiers to support the view that "the mere grant of the
commerce power to Congress dislodged state power"). In Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington
State Department of Revenue, Justice Antonin Scalia also noted: "The historical record provides no
grounds for reading the Commerce Clause to be other than what it says-an authorization for
Congress to regulate commerce." 483 U.S. 232, 260, 263 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. S.Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 767 n.2 (1945).
97. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
98. First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978) ("We thus find no support
in the First or Fourteenth Amendment, or in the decisions of this Court, for the proposition that
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remarked about for-profit corporations when deciding that they counted
as "persons" protected by the Religious Freedoms Restoration Act,
"'separate and apart from' the human beings who own, run, and are
employed by them, [they] cannot do anything at all." 99 Corporations
obviously are incapable of having religious sentiments, or any opinion
for that matter, just as they are unable to profess the loyalty attached to
citizenship. Unquestionably, cases such as Hobby Lobby consider the
corporation as a shell for its owners who wish to run their business
according to religious principles.' 00 Justice Samuel A. Alito's opinion
for the majority in Hobby Lobby agreed that calling a corporation a
person was a "fiction," the purpose of which is "to provide protection for
human beings."' 1 1 "A corporation," he explained, "is simply a form of
organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends."'0 2 Surely,
it is just as plausible to think that corporations represent their owners
when it comes to deciding whether they can be the objects of
discriminatory legislation.' 03
Ironically, the provisions of the First Amendment protecting
freedom of expression and religion were themselves regarded in the
eighteenth century as privileges and immunities of citizenship. The right
to free exercise of religion, for example, was a privilege intended to
safeguard the natural right of conscience. 0 Likewise, many sources in
that era referred to the freedoms of speech and religion as privileges of
being a citizen or subject. For example, Tacitus wrote in a Philadelphia
newspaper, in 1767, that Americans were "fortunate as to exist in these
blessed Times, when we are happy in the unlimited Enjoyment of that
most precious Privilege 'of thinking what we please, and of speaking
what we think."" 0 5 While defending his proposed Bill of Rights in
speech that otherwise would be within the protection of the First Amendment loses that protection
").
simply because its source is a corporation ....
99. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354, slip op. at 18-19 (U.S. June 30, 2014).
100. Id. at 18.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Nothing said on these pages should be understood as endorsing the result of Hobby Lobby,
or for that matter, Citizens United v. FederalElection Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding
that corporations have First Amendment rights to engage in election-related speech). Rather, the
point here is one of consistency. If for-profit corporations have First Amendment rights and can be
endowed with rights of conscience by Congress, it is hardly a stretch to consider them as protected
against economic discrimination by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. There are good reasons
to treat corporations differently from individuals, particularly with regard to the First Amendment
and elections, but those issues are beyond this Article's scope. Article IV merely requires states to
treat foreign corporations as they would their own; it does not obligate states to confer any
particular rights on business entities.
104. See Jay, supranote 60, at 59-60.
105. Tacitus, PA. GAZETrE, Apr. 23, 1767, at2.
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Congress, Madison praised "[t]he freedom of the press
and rights of
'0 6
conscience" as "those choicest privileges of the people.'
Of the three clauses-the Equal Protection Clause, the Dormant
Commerce Clause, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause-which is
the most logical basis for empowering courts to decide if a state has
improperly discriminated against a business from another state? The
latter clause was placed in both the Articles of Confederation and then
the Constitution in principal part to prevent state discrimination against
out-of-staters on matters of trade.10 7 That certainly cannot be said of the
Equal Protection Clause. And as for the Commerce Clause, the Framers
indeed were concerned with creating a national common market, but
they expressly assigned that task to Congress, not the judiciary.
Applying the Privileges and Immunities Clause to corporations
would, of course, require interpretation of the Constitution inasmuch as
the text does not resolve the issue. Early history also does not support
the idea that the term "citizens" in the clause was intended by the
Framers to include American corporations. Rather, the argument for
expanding the clause's reach to corporate entities is one of logical
consistency and public policy. The same reasons for counting
corporations as citizens for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, or as
persons under the Fourteenth Amendment, support their protection by
the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
IV.

WHY DID COURTS EXCLUDE CORPORATIONS FROM ARTICLE IV?

Since the mid-nineteenth century, courts consistently have
interpreted the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV as not
applicable to corporations. 8 Considering all the other instances in
which corporations have been treated like citizens, and even people, the
question is why courts came to this conclusion." 9 From the perspective
of a modem observer, the various explanations given for the exclusion
are unconvincing. Yet, that is looking at the issue in hindsight. The
question remains why the tape of constitutional history played the way it
did in this instance. Why did nineteenth-century judges seemingly
instinctively, and almost unanimously, find corporations ineligible for
citizenship under Article IV?
106. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 436 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of James Madison);
see Jay, supra note 60, at 45-46, 45 n.256 (quoting eighteenth-century sources referring to rights of
conscience, press, and speech as privileges of citizens).
107. See Jay, supranote 60, at 5-19 (detailing how the Privileges and Immunities Clause in the
Articles and the Constitution were intended to deal with interstate trade discrimination).
108. See supra notes 1-4, 9-10 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 61-64, 83-85 and accompanying text.
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In the eighteenth century, incorporation was far from the typical
business model."l0 Corporations were created by special legislative
enactments." l ' There were no general incorporation laws at the time- 2
states adopted those mostly in the mid- to late-nineteenth century."1
Initially, these new incorporation laws imposed significant capital
limitations on the companies, 1 3 and restricted the "scope of a business
corporation's powers and activity. ' 14 Few trading corporations were
chartered in American states prior to the creation of the Constitution. 1 5
The entire idea of business corporations, as opposed to incorporation of
religious, charitable, and educational societies, was highly controversial
far into the nineteenth century. Justice Louis D. Brandeis explained why:
Fear of the subjection of labor to capital. Fear of monopoly. Fear that
the absorption of capital by corporations, and their perpetual life,
might bring evils similar to those which attended mortmain. There was
a sense of some insidious menace inherent in large aggregations of
capital, particularly when held by corporations. 116

110.

FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS states:

The cloud of disfavor under which corporations labored in America was not dissipated
until near the end of the eighteenth century, and during the last 11 years of that period,
the total number of charters granted did not exceed 200, most of the business of that
period being transacted by unincorporated joint stock companies more in the nature of
limited partnerships.
1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 2, at 8
(Carol A. Jones ed., Thomson West rev. vol. 2006).
111. Id.at 7-8.
112. Id.at 7-10.
113. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 549 n.4, 550 n.5 (1933) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (listing the first general incorporation laws, from New York in 1846 to Virginia in 1902,
and noting capital restrictions); BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *462 (stating that "it is the will of
the king that erects a corporation").
114. Louis K. Liggett Co., 288 U.S. at 554-64 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
115. FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS states: "During the colonial
period of American history, there were but six purely native-born business corporations, although
English trading corporations operated on this continent. Only 20 were added to this list during the
" FLETCHER, supra note 110,
13-year period preceding the adoption of the federal Constitution ....
§ 2, at 8.
116. Louis K. Liggett Co., 288 U.S. at 548-49 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). At the Constitutional
Convention, a proposal to give Congress the power to create corporations was rejected in part due to
fear of corporate monopolies. Madison proposed that Congress be given power "[tlo grant charters
of incorporation in cases where the Public good may require them, and the authority of a single
State may be incompetent." See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 325
(Max Farrand ed., 1911). This proposal was referred to the Committee of Detail. See id.
Subsequently, in the course of discussing whether to empower Congress to create corporations to
operate post roads and canals, "[Madison's] primary object was however to secure an easy
communication between the States." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF

1787, at 615 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937). Rufus King objected that the "power [was]
unnecessary," and that "[t]he States will be prejudiced and divided into parties by it." Id.at 615-16.
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In chartering business corporations, legislatures both limited their
operations and extended all sorts of privileges and immunities to them,
including monopolization of certain markets, such as exclusive rights to
operate toll bridges, canals, and locks." 17 Most of the resulting
companies had a local focus. A great many incorporations were for
religious societies (such as congregations in specific towns) and
educational institutions (such as colleges), which thereby received a long
list of privileges and immunities." 8 Municipalities were created in the
same manner, and likewise obtained extensive privileges and
immunities. For that matter, a number of the American colonies began as
corporations." 9 As a reading of colonial charters will show, they
bestowed privilege after privilege on the colonies. 2 Delegates at the
Constitutional Convention debated whether the states still should be
regarded as "mere corporations,"' 12' "dependent on the Gen[eral]
Legislature, ' 22 or sovereign governments. Whatever the context, the
incorporations focused on particular jurisdictions, not interstate
operations. This probably explains why no one in the founding
generation discussed whether corporations were covered by the
Privileges and Immunities Clause-and likewise, why the issue did not
arise in debates over diversity jurisdiction at the Constitutional
He predicted that "in Philad[elphia] & New York, It will be referred to the establishment of a Bank,
which has been a subject of contention in those Cities. In other places it will be referred to
mercantile monopolies." Id. at 616. George Mason argued that the power of incorporation by
Congress should be limited "to the single case of Canals," because "[h]e was afraid of monopolies
of every sort." Id. Even limited to canals, the Convention rejected giving Congress the express
power of incorporation. See id.
117. See Jay, supra note 60, at 23 (describing and quoting a 1788 South Carolina statute
granting privileges to corporations, such as erecting and operating "locks, dams or canals").
118. Id. at 23-24 (providing an example of legislative charters for religious societies, as well as
Harvard).
119.

See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 552 (Max

Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) (statement of Governor Morris); FLETCHER, supra note 110 § 2, at 6 ("In
America, some of the colonies were themselves essentially public corporations, albeit they were
(footnote call number omitted)).
chartered companies ....
120. See, e.g., Charter of Connecticut (1662), reprinted in THE FEDERAL AND STATE
AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES,
FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 533 (Francis
AMERICAN ORGANIC LAWS] (providing that the colonists
Immunities of free and natural Subjects" in England); see
Charter of Rhode Island & Providence Plantations (1663), reprintedin AMERICAN ORGANIC LAWS
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS,
AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE
Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter
"shall have and enjoy all Liberties and

at 3220 ("[Colonists] shall have and enjoye all libertyes and immunityes of ffree and naturall
subjects.., borne within the realme of England."); Jay, supranote 60, at 32-33 (detailing privileges
granted by colonial charters).
121. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 116, at 362
(statement of Colonel Mason).
122. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 119, at 357
(statement of James Madison).
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Convention and in ratification proceedings. They were not important
interstate actors, but rather impersonal entities created for a range of
specific local purposes, most of which had nothing to do with business.
Words themselves have no essence; their meaning varies by
conventional usage, which can diverge among speakers of the same
language and change over time. "Such is the character of human
language, that no word conveys to the mind, in all situations, one single
definite idea," Chief Justice Marshall wrote in McCulloch v.
Maryland'23 The meaning of words depends on the culture in which
they are used, including the assumptions of the era in which they are
expressed. As Ludwig Wittgenstein said: "[T]o imagine a language
means to imagine a form of life."' 24 How words are used explains a great
deal about a culture. In this instance, the meaning of citizenship and its
attendant rights have changed significantly since the Constitution was
adopted, as have attitudes about corporations.
For early Americans, the idea of a "citizen" paralleled the English
concept of a "subject." The privileges and immunities of subjects arose
from the reciprocal obligations of the monarch and the people born on
British soil. The subject owed allegiance to the crown, and the king or
125
queen in turn owed a duty to protect the subject's natural rights.
"Allegiance is the right of the magistrate, and protection the right of the
people," Blackstone wrote. 126 This allegiance was tied to birth in the
crown's dominions, and it was a permanent obligation, "which
cannot be forfeited, cancelled, or altered," except by "the united
concurrence of the legislature.' 27
In the English scheme, it would have been bizarre to think of
corporations as subjects, because the elements of birth in the country and
fealty to the monarch were inherently missing. An early English treatise
writer on corporate law explained that "[a] Corporation aggregate cannot
do Fealty; for a Body invisible cannot be in Person, cannot swear," and
thus, "cannot commit Treason.' ' 128 Furthermore, there would have been
no point in worrying about discrimination against corporations by

123.

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 414 (1819).

124.

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 7e (G.E.M. Anscombe trans.,

3d ed. 2001).
125. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *119 (describing reciprocal rights and duties of the
monarch and subject).
126. Id.
127. Id.at *357. By contrast, "aliens" only owed allegiance "for so long time as he continues
within the king's domain and protection." Id.at *358. They could not have "a permanent property in
lands" without owing permanent allegiance to the monarch, "which would probably be inconsistent
with that, which he owes to his own natural liege lord." Id.at *360.
128.

LAW OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 27, at 6.
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different parts of the kingdom. Unlike the thirteen states in America,
Great Britain was a single country. All of the privileges and immunities
of subjects were controlled by Parliament. At the same time, it was easy
to rationalize the legal existence of corporations by analogizing them to
real people---"artificial persons."' 29 They were owned by subjects who
were in effect acting as one individual for purposes of the company.
Under English law, corporations had numerous "privileges and
immunities"' 130 that also were possessed by subjects, including the ability
"[t]o purchase lands, and hold them, for the benefit of themselves and
their successors."'' Corporations are a "Fiction of Law," that are
"framed in similitude as a natural Body; with a Capacity to take, hold,
and enjoy, and act as a natural Body: it is a Capacity framed to be and
act as one Person."' 32 In a manner of speaking, corporations
were "born" in England by acts of Parliament, and they could even die
through dissolution.
When the Revolution abruptly transformed Americans from
subjects to citizens, they seamlessly adapted the concept of being a
subject to the idea of citizenship. Indeed, the whole point of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause was to continue the rights Americans
possessed as British subjects when they traveled or did business
throughout the kingdom, including in other colonies.' 33 Americans of the
revolutionary era also associated citizenship with loyalty, literally
expelling the disloyal and confiscating the property of those unwilling to
transfer allegiance.134 Pledging allegiance to the new American states
literally was required of many in the founding era, as the rebelling
colonies went about cleansing themselves of British loyalists. 35
of whom allegiance is
Citizenship could only be conferred on "a person
136
treason.'
of
guilty
be
may
who
and
predicable,

129. See supra text accompanying note 26.
130.

BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *456.

131.

Id.at *463.

132.

LAw OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 27, at 1-2.

133. See Jay, supra note 60, at 19-20.
134.

MARY BETH NORTON, THE BRITISH-AMERICANS: THE LOYALIST EXILES IN ENGLAND,

1774-1789, at 176 (1972); see HAROLD M. HYMAN, To TRY MEN'S SoULs: LOYALTY TESTS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 61 (1959); Ruth M. Keesey, Loyalism in Bergen County, New Jersey, 18 WM.
& MARY Q. 558, 561 (1961); Robert S. Lambert, The Confiscationof Loyalist Property in Georgia,
1782-1786, 20 WM. & MARY Q. 80, 81-82 (1963); Harry E. Seyler, Pennsylvania's First Loyalty
Oath, 3 HIST. EDUC. J. 114, 114-16 (1952) (providing examples of a loyalty oath).
135. In addition to loyalty oaths during the Revolution, slates in the early nation commonly
required persons wishing to become citizens to take a loyalty oath. See Jay, supra note 60, at 36, 49
& n.279.
136. Wheeden v. Camden & Amboy R.R., 1 Grant 420,424 (Pa. 1856).
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In modem America, the legal connection between allegiance and
citizenship has become tattered. 3 7 According to the Court's
interpretation of the First Amendment, a person cannot be forced to
pledge allegiance to the nation.'3 8 American citizens even have a First
Amendment right to belong to organizations that seek to overthrow the
government by force, and advocate the same, so long as they do not act
to further the illegal ends of the group. 13 9 Citizens can be conscripted
into the armed forces, which might be seen as the ultimate test of
loyalty, but permanent non-citizen residents also have been subjected to
the draft. 4 ° It is true that, at naturalization ceremonies, new citizens
pledge to "bear true faith and allegiance to" the Constitution and laws of
the United States and vow to "bear arms on behalf of the United States
when required by the law."'' However, conscientious objectors to
military service may opt out of the requirement and still be
naturalized. 142 In any event, after citizenship is conferred, newly-minted
citizens are free to change their minds about loyalty and advocate
overthrowing the government.
Today "citizenship" is regarded as more of a legal status than a
matter of allegiance to a sovereign, especially at the state level. People
become citizens of the United States to benefit from the privileges and
immunities of that status, even if their personal loyalty remains with
another homeland. "Dual citizenship" is now possible, even if that term
would have been an oxymoron in the eighteenth century. 143 The same is
137. This is not to deny that many Americans connect citizenship with loyalty to their country.
The issue here is the legal relationship between citizenship and allegiance to a state or nation.
138. See W. Va. State Bd. Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 626, 642 (1943) (holding that
students cannot be required to pledge allegiance to the flag because "no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein").
139. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 221-24, 228-30 (1961) (construing the Smith
Act to exclude culpability of "mere passive members" of the Communist Party in order to avoid
"close constitutional questions"); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 321-22 (1957) (stating that
mere "advocacy [of forcible overthrow of the state], even though uttered with the hope that it may
ultimately lead to violent revolution, is too remote from concrete action to be regarded as the kind
of indoctrination preparatory to action" that is outside the First Amendment).
140. See Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (2012) (requiring draft
registration "of every male citizen of the United States, and every other male person residing in the
United States"). The Universal Military Training and Service Act, which became effective June 19,
1951, made aliens who were "permanent residents of this country" subject to conscription. Astrup v.
INS, 402 U.S. 509, 510 n.l (1971).
141. 8 C.F.R. § 337.1 (2015).
142. 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a)(5) (2012) (providing that applicants for citizenship who "by reason of
religious training and belief' cannot participate in war still may become naturalized citizens).
143. See Mandoli v. Acheson, 344 U.S. 133, 134, 139 (1952) (holding that a U.S. citizen by
birth did not lose such citizenship as a result of gaining Italian citizenship through his parents and
living abroad past the age of majority).
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true of state citizenship, only more so. No proof of allegiance is required
to become a state citizen, even though, in the beginning of the nation, it
was, at least if one wanted to exercise a right open only to citizensvoting. 144 No state now demands that its citizens serve in the militia,
1 45
although this was an obligation of male citizens in the early republic.
Furthermore, under the Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause, once individuals have established a domicile in a state, they are
entitled to vote within, at most, a month or two, 46 which hardly seems
long enough to develop feelings of loyalty or even familiarity with local
issues. The first state constitutions often imposed one-year waiting
periods for voting, along with property ownership requirements, which
were designed to assure that voters were committed members of the state
its proper governance, as well as knowledgeable about
with a stake 4in
7
local affairs. 1
State citizenship now is irrelevant for most purposes, and the idea
of loyalty to a state is not a concept most Americans today have even
contemplated. Residency and domicile, not citizenship, are the critical
questions when it comes to ascertaining an American's legal affiliation
with a state. Residency determines such matters as eligibility to vote,
qualification for in-state tuition at public universities, and ability to
claim various state subsidies, as well as liability for state taxes. In effect,
residency has become the modem substitute for state citizenship, as the
Court has squarely held in applying the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. 148 Yet residency in a state does not depend on showing loyalty to
144. Jay, supra note 60, at 48-49 (discussing the oaths required for state voting privileges). But
see Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 173-75 (1874) (denying that "suffi-age was
necessarily one of the absolute rights of citizenship"). The Court was forced to this conclusion in
order to deny women the franchise under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 163-64, 177-78. Chancellor Kent had written earlier that "[t]he privilege of
voting, and the legal capacity for office, are not essential to the character of a citizen, for women are
citizens without either." 2 KENT, supra note 53, at 258 n.b. Other courts disagreed, stating that
although women were citizens, in effect men voted on their behalf-they "are generally dependent
upon adult males through whom they enjoy the benefits of those rights and privileges." Amy v.
Smith, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 326, 333-34 (1822).
145. See Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, § 1,1Stat. 271 (repealed 1903) (requiring militia service
of "every free able-bodied ... male citizen" between the ages eighteen and forty-five); Michael J.
Golden, The Dormant Second Amendment: Exploring the Rise, Fall, and Potential Resurrection of
Independent State Militias, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.J. 1021, 1028 (2013).
146. See Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 680-81 (1973) (upholding a fifty-day voter
registration cutoff as "necessary to permit preparation of accurate voter lists," but affirming the
holding in Dunn v. Blumstein that a three-month waiting period was "too long"); Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 348 (1972) (holding that "30 days appears to be an ample period of time
for the State to complete whatever administrative tasks are necessary to prevent fraud-and a year,
or three months, too much").
147. See, e.g., Jay, supra note 60, at 36, 50 & n.286.
148. See Supreme Court v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 64 (1988) (stating that "[w]hile the

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2015

25

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 4

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 44:79

that sovereign, such as by swearing allegiance. Rather, it means that a
person is living inside a state's borders. 4 9 Residency is not even the
same thing as being a domiciliary, which includes the element of
intending to remain in the state indefinitely.' 5 0 Even so, allegiance is not
a requirement for establishing a domicile.
But why would the Court treat corporations differently for purposes
of diversity jurisdiction, or regard them as persons in so many other
contexts? Each application has its own explanation, or rather
rationalization, tied to a particular history.
Treating corporations as citizens for diversity purposes was
understandable given that the abilities to sue and be sued in a corporate
name were long considered core attributes of a corporation.' 5 ' Bringing
them within federal judicial jurisdiction also did not require recognizing
that they had any specific substantive rights. As the Kentucky Court of
Appeals observed in 1851, "[t]he privilege of suing, and the form of
suing, and the question in what tribunal the [case] is to be entertained, do
not reach the question of the privilege of acquiring the rights which are
to be asserted in the suit."'5 The necessity of giving corporations access
to national courts in interstate disputes was beyond doubt, particularly as
the corporate form of business became vastly more common.
Furthermore, including them within diversity jurisdiction had a
convenient explanation that might have resonated with the Framers had
they thought about the matter. States controlled all aspects of the
corporation's existence. They needed only to authorize shareholders to
sue or be sued on behalf of the company, and thus, their citizenship
could count for diversity purposes. The Court eventually took something
like that approach to the problem by deciding that, for this purpose, the
shareholders were the true parties appearing in the case.' 53

Privileges and Immunities Clause cites the term 'Citizens,' for analytic purposes citizenship and
residency are essentially interchangeable").
149.

See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1502 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "residency" as "[a] place

of residence" and defining "residence" to mean "bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place").
150. In determining whether a person is a citizen of a state for federal diversity jurisdiction,
courts inquire as to whether the party is a domiciliary, not a mere resident. See Kanter v. WarnerLambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) ("The natural person's state citizenship is then
determined by her state of domicile, not her state of residence. A person's domicile is her permanent
home, where she resides with the intention to remain or to which she intends to return.").
151.

See LAW OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 27, at 2 (defining "corporation" as a "Body

Politick" that, among other attributes, could "sue or be sued").
152. Commonwealth v. Milton, 51 Ky. (12 B. Mon.) 212, 228 (1851); see also Tatem v.
Wright, 23 N.J.L. 429, 446 (1852) (opinion of Elmer, J.) ("A corporation having a right to sue like a
natural person, may well be considered an inhabitant or citizen of a particular state, for the purpose
of bringing suit ... ").
153. See supratext accompanying notes 67-68.
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Not recognizing corporations as persons for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment would have conflicted with the reality that, by
the last decades of the nineteenth century, these business entities owned
vast amounts of property and were increasingly critical to the national
economy. Courts certainly could not have allowed states to confiscate
the property of corporations or deny them fair trials. The consequences
for the owners of the companies, as well as interstate commerce itself,
would have been incalculable.
V.

CONCLUSION

Since the mid-nineteenth century, courts have held consistently that
corporations cannot be citizens for purposes of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV. By itself, that conclusion is reasonable,
given the historical legacy of basing membership in the polity as a
citizen or subject on loyalty to a monarch or republic. Considering the
scarcity of interstate business corporations when the Constitution was
written, however, it is highly unlikely that any of the Framers or ratifiers
thought about the matter. But the same goes for diversity jurisdiction,
under which corporations are counted as citizens because they embody
the interests of actual people. The Court also extended to corporations
many of the same rights that individuals had under the Fourteenth
Amendment, with no explanation at the time.
This episode of constitutional history stands as a prime example of
'
what Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote about-"[t]he life of the law,"154
5
5
that it was not one of "logic: it has been experience."' He explained:
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, and even
the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a
good deal more to do than syllogism in determining the rules by which
men should be governed. The law embodies the story of a
nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt
with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a
book of mathematics. 156
There is a good case to be made that, in principal, courts should
have brought corporations under the wing of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause on the same basis that they included them within
diversity jurisdiction. Ultimately, in both contexts, real people are the
154.

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 2 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.

1881).
155. Id.
156. Id.
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ones affected by treatment of the companies they own. The reasons why
courts did not do so are somewhat complex, but they are not based so
much on logic as attitudes about citizenship and corporations in early
America that have long faded. Modem corporations come in many
shapes and sizes; the great majority are small businesses, while some are
so enormous that their downfall could imperil the national economy. At
the same time, a large percentage of the investors in publicly-traded
corporations are pension funds for ordinary people, a phenomenon that
no nineteenth-century judge could have imagined. Yet the doctrine
excluding corporations from the Privileges and Immunities Clause
persists through unreflective repetition, its mission largely supplanted by
interpretations of the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.
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